In support of the views recently expressed by Rob Stevens and Michael

Jones (that loss of chance of medical cure is a real loss), I would

add this example.  If a pharmacist, in breach of warranty, supplies a

useless substance, instead of a prescribed drug that has a forty per

cent chance of curing the patient's condition, there is plainly a

breach of contract, some remedy is due, and, if the patient is not

cured, it is difficult to see how the remedy could be measured except

by valuing the chance.  If this is correct where the pharmacist is in

breach of contract, the same result must surely follow if the

pharmacist negligently supplies the useless substance free of charge

under some health care scheme.  And if this is right surely the same

result must follow if the physician negligently prescribes the

useless substance in the first place instead of the proper drug.  I

wonder if objections to valuation of chance may perhaps derive from

some more general objections to the practical operation of the civil

litigation system (would the objections be pressed if we had a system

of prompt and inexpensive valuation of claims?)  Stephen Waddams